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Abstract: 
The paper examines the challenges raised by “partnerships” between state and non-state 
security stakeholders, relying on two security experiments developed in Johannesburg 
wealthy neighborhoods. It raises the question of their monitoring by the police – understood 
as the police capacity to coordinate the multiple, non-state policing initiatives that otherwise 
remain fragmented “security networks”. The community initiatives seem easier to integrate 
within the local police strategies – since the private security sector has got its own, market-
driven logic. However, the formalisation of partnerships between police and communities 
have generally failed, due to their technical fragility (flexibility of community involvement, 
personalization of relationships leading to possible corruption and conflict) and their political 
difficulties (if the private sector can easily target the high income area, it is considered less 
legitimate for police to set up “elitist policing” thanks to the involvement of wealthy 
communities). Finally, abandoning these forms of partnerships might encourage a further 
privatization of the production of security – using more classical, easier-to-set “contracts” 
with the private sector that do not seem to lead to a real “partnership” with, nor a monitoring 
by, the police. 
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In the context of the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which 
witnessed both the spread of crime into areas that were previously protected through 
the apartheid containment strategy, and the necessary restructuring of the police 
service1, the South African State massively appealed to non-State actors to help the 
police fighting crime, describing civil society (defined as both business and 
community organisations, private security companies and police reservists) as 
important “partners” to the State in the fight against crime2. 
These public partnerships with residents associations on the one hand, with the 
private sector on the other, are in line with worldwide trends to promote security 
governance, and reform the police in order to make it more accountable to the 
residents and more efficient in its crime prevention strategy3. However, behind the 
term “partnership” lays a plurality of agreements: roles, functions and responsibilities 
regarding crime prevention are unevenly shared, depending on the local contexts and 
the stakeholders involved. 
Some authors rather speak of “security networks” to describe the pluralisation of 
policing agents at the local level4. The notion of network is looser than that of 
partnership. Newburn defines it as an “increasingly complex and diffenciated 
patchwork of security providers”; he stresses the importance, “when thinking of the 
idea of a ‘network of security’, not to overemphasize the degree of integration”. The 
term of network might be closer than that of ‘partnership’ to the reality experimented 
on the ground – lack of real coordination, prevalence of ad hoc and flexible 
agreements, etc. On the contrary, partnership implies an agreement between several 
parts, legally or morally binding, and in the case of public-private partnerships 
indicates some control implemented by the public authority. However, in the security 
field, little empirical evidence or theoretical analysis have been devoted to the 
monitoring or regulating capacity of the police over non-state security initiatives; and 
this is what this paper wishes to address, since we follow Shaw5 in arguing that the 
central issue in security governance is not so much how to eradicate “these security 
instruments that compete with the state”, but how to manage them. 
There are of course forms of partnership that involve a minimal public control, 
such as sub-contracting or outsourcing police’s functions and duties6 - where control 
is reduced to the legal regulation of non-state activity (with little resources to actually 
check its application7), and to a possible (but difficult) assessment of the outcomes of 
such activity. In this paper we looked for a little bit more than that: we considered 
joint security operations where the police can try and make use of the supplementary 
technical, financial and staff resources offered by the non-state actors. In this sense, 
we assume8 that the state is more than just “one (albeit important) player in a network 
of governing agencies”9, and, especially in South Africa where it has got some 
administrative capacity as well as a strong political legitimacy, it ought to play a 
monitoring role over non-state security initiatives. Therefore, even if the boundaries 
between public and private policing stakeholders, practices and strategies are 
                                                 
1 Leggett 2005. 
2 White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998. 
3 Shearing and Stenning 1983. 
4 Newburn 2001, Johnston 2001. 
5 Shaw 2000. 
6 Schönteich et al 2004. 
7 Berg 2003. 
8 In line with Loader and Walker 2001. 
9 Johnston 2001. 
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increasingly blurred10, we’ll insist, on the contrary, on the remaining, major 
distinction between the two types of actors – that has to do with the state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of physical force. 
The paper will draw on two case studies11: Parkview and Atholl, two middle- to 
upper-class areas located in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg, where the residents 
have chosen not to erect gates and barriers to protect themselves12, but have preferred 
to rely on community policing as formally encouraged by the State. In both cases, 
they have created non-profit, “community” security companies, a kind of “third way” 
between full reliance on public policing and the hiring of a private security company. 
These experiments have been –or are being currently- discarded by the police, after 
having operated in informal ways for several years. They are highlighting, by both 
their successes and their failures, not only the technical complexities but also the 
political challenges lying in the construction of security partnerships between state 
and non-state actors. The first part of the paper will track down the specificity of this 
“third way”, and the blurred line distinguishing community and business security 
initiatives; the second part will discuss the options available for the police to monitor 
non-state security initiatives. 
How different are community security initiatives from private 
security companies? 
Residents’ groups in Atholl and Parkview, two suburban areas in northern 
Johannesburg, have decided to set up their own “community” security company, 
deemed not for profit and dedicated to the neighbourhood. Many residents had indeed 
claimed their dissatisfaction with private security companies, judged not “dedicated” 
enough to the area and becoming complacent after a while. The development of 
Community Policing Forums13 (CPFs) and the public encouragement for community 
policing constituted a favourable context, the police often enhancing locally what was 
seen as a supplementary manpower more akin than the private sector to work with the 
police. 
In Atholl, a high-income suburb not far from Alexandra township, a residents’ 
association launched what they call Atholl Security Project. Residents contribute on a 
voluntary basis about R40014 a month to the project, which pays for the seven private 
security guards (3 shifts) permanently standing at the entrances of the suburb, and also 
for a few agents employed by Atholl Project, repairing pavement and lighting, 
trimming the trees, collecting garbage etc. 
 
                                                 
10 Baker 2002, Carrier 1999. 
11 Field research was conducted in 2004 and 2005, as part of the programme on « Privatisation of 
Security in African Cities : urban dynamics and new forms of governance », funded by the French 
Institute of South Africa. 
12 We have elaborated elsewhere on the road closure issue in Johannesburg (Bénit 2004; Bénit-Gbaffou 
forthcoming). See also Peyroux 2005. 
13 Statutory bodies set up by the police in each police precinct, in order to develop links with the 
residents. 
14 About 50 euros in January 2006. 
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Map1 - Securing Atholl without closing off the suburb 
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Photo 1- Different layers of 
security companies – one can 
never be too careful 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Parkview (a police precinct including several middle-income to wealthy 
suburbs), unlike in Atholl the community security project was initiated and monitored 
by the Community Policing Forum (CPF). Parkview police have indeed largely 
supported the initiative, enhancing what they considered a real partnership with the 
“community”, under the name CPF on the Beat. CPF on the Beat is a non-profit 
organisation set up by the Community Policing Forum in order to employ reservists 
(security guards, after it has been declared illegal to pay reservists –supposed to be 
mere “volunteers” helping the police) to patrol the area. The police would train and 
monitor the guards, and they would be in control of its operational use; whilst the 
community was in charge of the finance (collection of the money15 and payment of 
the guards) through CPF on the Beat. The creation of the CPF on the Beat was 
rendered necessary because the Community Policing Forum itself, being a police 
statutory body, could not legally directly raise funds to employ security agents… 
 
Both projects have been tempted over time to expand beyond the 
neighbourhood’s boundaries – their success in terms of crime reduction being an 
incentive for growth (figure 1, map 1). 
Competition between security companies to access a local market is fierce, 
especially in wealthier suburbs where a demand for expensive security policies is 
likely to develop. In Atholl for instance, the ward councillor had to intervene to stop a 
physical battle between agents of competing private security companies: one of them 
                                                 
15 From R100 to R200 depending on the nature of the contributor (resident, small or big business): 12 
to 25 euros. 
Atholl, 2004, © Claire Bénit. The 7 suburb entrances are guarded by 
security agents. The suburb is not closed off, but it is quite strictly 
controlled, each « stranger » to the suburb being watched, sometimes 
registered and followed. Whilst the overall cost is higher, the difference 
with enclosed neighbourhoods in terms of freedom of movement is here 
becoming subtle!
Atholl, 2006, © Claire Bénit-Gbaffou. The Atholl 
logo (green triangle) is used more as a means of 
social pressure on those who are not 
“contributors”, than as a crime deterrent for 
outsiders. It does not prevent the “contributors” 
to keep contracting with their former private 
security company. The total household expense 
for security can reach R1.000 (150 euros) a 
month. 
 
Photo 2- Guard hut at each 
entrance of Atholl suburb 
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was blocking the roads to prevent the others to enter the suburb, even throwing stones 
against the houses of people contracting with its competitors! 
In such a competitive context, 
attempts to create integrated security 
networks, or real partnerships not only 
with the police but amongst different 
private security companies, are 
doomed. Bramley police (under which 
Atholl is falling) for instance proposed 
to set up a room within the police 
station to be used jointly by a police 
officer and a security agent (everyday 
from a different company) – which 
meant each private security agent 
would have had to work for the whole 
area (and not only for its company’s 
customers). The initiative failed 
spectacularly. 
In this context also, “community 
security companies” (set up as non-
profit organisations) are very clearly 
identified by private security companies 
as competitors, and even “unfair 
competition” since the community 
security companies obviously do not 
comply with the private security 
regulations – and have pretensions to a 
local monopoly. It was one of the 
reasons why the Parkview initiative was 
eventually declared illegal by the 
Provincial commissioner, lobbied by a 
big private security company16. 
The competition is even more direct in Atholl, where the private security 
company originally hired by Atholl Security Project to guard the entrances of the 
suburb is progressively being ejected from the area, Atholl Security Project 
attempting to replace the private company’s staff with its own contract workers. The 
manager of the Project indeed argues that it would allow the residents for a better 
crime prevention strategy, avoiding “outsourcing” and the unnecessary spreading of 
information to “outsiders”. For the private security company, however, the 
progressive replacement of its agent by people employed by the Atholl Security 
Project is only a business strategy. Dumping the prices on the pretext of being a non-
profit project, failing to pay regularly the private company it hired for the 7 permanent 
security posts, the chairman of the residents association is accused to try and push the 
security company out of the area17. The security company is currently busy 
                                                 
16 The other reasons being: a community initiative becoming a business; the growing visibility of the 
initiative, becoming a model (with other suburbs asking for its extension to their area); the political 
accusation of representing “elitist policing”; a personal conflict between the chair of the CPF and the 
manager of CPF on the Beat. 
17 The Atholl Project proposes to patrol the street at night for R250 per household (R400 for the current 
private security company). Its failure to pay the security company led the latter (running at R30.000 a 
Figure 1- Portraits of community leaders – 
and security businessmen 
 
The operational manager of the Atholl Security 
Project is a former employee of a security 
company. He was the local representative for 
the security company in Atholl, and got to 
know the customers. He then decided to do his 
security project on his own, sidelining the 
security company, and approached the chair of 
the residents association who was seduced by 
his project.  
 
In Parkview, the manager of CPF on the Beat 
owns two businesses in Parkview, and he 
started uniting businesses to join a common 
security scheme, before being given the 
opportunity (by the CPF and the police) to 
create CPF on the Beat: a statutory non-profit 
organisation, collecting funds from voluntary 
donations (for which the acronym CPF is a 
good marketing device). The manager also was 
nominated deputy-chair of the CPF, but due to 
increasing conflicts with the other members of 
the CPF (accusing him of hiding CPF on the 
Beat’s benefits, supposedly to be transferred to 
the CPF account), he had to resign. 
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denouncing to the police authorities these illegal (deemed “criminal”) practices – not 
only business-wise, but also by using employees as street patrollers, who are not 
legally registered as security agents. 
 
The distinction between community- and business-driven security projects is 
obviously extremely blurred. In such wealthy neighbourhoods, the households’ 
contributions are potentially high and security issues are a major political concern, 
giving local leaders much scope for political advancement as well as personal 
enrichment18. Non-profit, “community” security companies seldom remain such, 
since temptations are numerous to transform into a thriving business and to make 
huge profits.  
“Community” security companies are located in a specific niche of the private 
security market, promoting their small-scale, flexibility and accountability to the 
residents and to the police. But it is also a niche developed by some small private 
security companies, operating in a few suburbs only, who compete with the major 
ones by underlining their flexibility, their responsiveness to local demands, their 
closeness to the “community”19. The term “community” is indeed a very powerful 
marketing instrument, with or without the police support20. In Parkview, the 
confusion on the name CPF on the Beat allowed the organisation to raise funds in the 
name of the Community Policing Forum (CPF) – and there was a fierce legal battle 
led by the CPF and the police (after the project had been discarded) in order to forbid 
the use of such a misleading name. 
 
Photo 3- CPF on the Beat: The 
police and the community support 
as a marketing device 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
loss per month for its guarding operations) to cross-subsidise it by using the profit made by its armed 
response unit (about 300 customers in the area). 
18 As was stated by Didier and Morange (2005) in the case of Cape Town. 
19 The main difference with “community” security companies being the nature of the link with public 
authorities (the police in particular). This is the main point developed infra. 
20 See Angot 2006. 
Parkview, 2004, © Claire Bénit. CPF on the Beat is 
displaying these pamphlets now against the will of the 
community and the police, who have discarded the initiative 
(that they originally supported, as stated) as a profit-making 
operation, and voluntarily playing on the confusion with the 
CPF.
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Moreover, in the name of the 
“community”, security projects are able to 
put an increased social pressure over the 
residents who do not contribute financially, 
for instance in Atholl through the creation of 
a database pinpointing the residents not 
contributing. 
However, community security projects 
are also being criticised by some residents 
for their lack of efficiency, in spite of their 
supposed local commitment. Small is not 
always beautiful, as smaller security 
companies (being community or business) 
lack the “back-up” system – an efficient 
radio system, a good training, backing cars, 
etc., allowing for quick and efficient 
response. This criticism is extended by 
residents to the police service itself, whose 
lack of resources is understood as the root of 
their inefficiency. 
How can police monitor non-State security initiatives? 
However, non-state security stakeholders wishing to help the police21 in 
addressing its lack of resource or personnel shortage encounter important technical as 
well as structural difficulties. We are not even mentioning here the political issue22: 
the overall equity question raised by the creation of an “elitist” police – obvious in 
these types of initiatives in the wealthy areas (where residents are able to pay for a 
better service), but also contained in a way in the very principle of “community 
policing”, a factor of inequality since it is drawing on whichever resources are locally 
available. 
The direct, personal contacts between police officers and residents or security 
companies, especially when involving money, are likely to slip into basic corruption 
practices. The weberian notion of an anonymous and therefore efficient and just 
bureaucracy is still entrenched in the very centralised South African Police Service, 
unlike in many other African countries23. However trends for decentralization, an 
increasing accountability to the residents at the station level and the enhancement of 
local partnerships, have certainly created expectations difficult to fulfill24, as well as 
opened a scope for the personalization of relationships with the police25. 
In a system of locally unequal policing resources26, what were the options for 
the residents of wealthy areas willing to help the police with what they have to offer: 
their money, while trying to avoid setting up mechanisms for corruption? Money 
                                                 
21 As stated by several residents, they would better ‘help the police’ than ‘make the security companies 
millionaires’… 
22 This point is developed in Bénit, 2005. 
23 Olivier de Sardan 2004. 
24 See Steinberg 2005, showing the contradiction between white rural communities’ expectations, 
developed through a participation process (that the police and/or the residents target stock theft) and the 
national priorities leading to focus the local police resources on personal assaults, dominant in the 
townships. 
25 Hornberger 2004. 
26 The legitimacy of which is not discussed in detail here (see note 20). 
Figure 2 – The “community”, a 
marketing device? 
 
NON-contributors. We are currently 
trying to appeal to all residents of Atholl 
to assist us in some way, and we 
acknowledge those who really cannot 
afford the extra burden […]. The map of 
our suburb has really assisted us in the 
following up of residents, and one family 
has also really contributed in assisting us 
with the computerization of Atholl map 
and database! This is near completion, and 
we will be able to detail residents and all 
contributors, as well as those regrettably 
still “unknown” to the project. 
 
Atholl newsletter, November 2003 
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handling, or hiring of supplementary policing personnel, needed to be mediated, either 
through a change of scale within the police (national police), or through an 
intermediary non-state body, providing in both case a form of control by creating a 
distance between contributors and beneficiaries. 
The first solution – involving for instance donations to the national police 
budget that will eventually be allocated to the ad hoc police station- has not been 
adopted very long in Parkview nor in Atholl, because of the high level of social and 
spatial inequalities in South Africa and the post-apartheid importance of the principle 
of redistribution of public resources. In this context, donations to the national budget 
coming from a wealthy neighborhood are to be redistributed to deprived areas27. 
There are some informal agreements between donating communities and the police 
hierarchy (at the metropolitan and provincial level) to allocate the donated funds to 
the area it originated from – so as not to discourage donations; however these 
agreements remain informal and their formalization would be politically difficult. 
The second solution was attempted in Parkview, through the creation of CPF on 
the Beat- a non profit organization that could collect funds, unlike the Community 
Policing Forum, a police statutory body. However the financial monitoring of this 
mediating agency by the Community Policing Forum failed28, as CPF on the Beat 
acted less and less as a “community” body, more and more like a business. 
An alternative and more common mediating agent would be …a private security 
company hired by the residents, and that would be expected by its collective customer 
(the “community”) to work with the police. Establishing partnerships between the 
police and private security companies is indeed easier when there is one dominant, if 
not monopolistic, security company (be it private or community) in an area. Berg29, in 
her case study of Cape Town, showed that the most efficient public-private security 
partnerships emerged in the City Improvement Districts30, where a single security 
company is usually in charge with patrolling the delimited area. The same could be 
said about enclosures (restriction of access to public streets in a suburb), or in the 
security villages (private and walled neighbourhoods) – manned and patrolled as well 
by a dominant security company. 
 
 
 
Photo 4 - “you enter a zone patrolled by 
Stallion” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Legislation allows police authorities to redistribute donations if they wish to do so. 
28 The manager of CPF on the Beat refused to submit its financial accounts to the Community Policing 
Forum (CPF), as had been agreed, but very informally, between him and the CPF chair when they were 
still friends. 
29 Berg 2004b. 
30 A City Improvement District is a perimeter within which property owners and businesses agree to 
pay a supplementary levy that will be used within the perimeter to enhance urban services, in particular 
security and cleanliness. The board of owners will usually hire a managing agency, which will employ 
a team of cleaners and security agents servicing the area. See also Didier and Morange, Peyroux in this 
issue. 
Cyrilldene, 2003, © Claire Bénit. Residents have gathered to 
hire a single security company to patrol their neighbourhood, 
in order to avoid security network fragmentation. Such 
initiatives are however difficult to set up, due to residential 
mobility, ongoing contracts with rival security companies (the 
cost of changing security provider can be high), and unequal 
household financial capacity in the neighbourhood. 
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However, these partnerships remain very fragile and probably quite limited. The 
marketing strategy of private security companies necessarily puts forward a 
competitive agenda – and their crime priorities and logic of action significantly differ 
from the police’s31. 
Such a competition did not exist in Parkview residential area, where a strong 
relationship existed between the police and the ‘community’ security company 
through an empowered Community Policing Forum, whose representatives were 
significantly attending police management meetings, and were not pushed by any 
marketing concerns to take over the monitoring of the supplementary security force 
they were paying for. These difficulties are highlighted a contrario by the enthusiasm 
Parkview police expressed when talking about the community security initiative: 
 
“They [CPF on the Beat] had the support of the police: they had the same radio channel, a direct 
link with the police. It was in a way the police’s own private company. I could dictate them 
where to go: ‘there is crime in that street, deploy ten guys over there…’ It is the way we should 
actually work with private companies! But I can’t just say to ADT [a big private security 
company]: ‘go there, there is crime’!” (Parkview police officer) 
Conclusion 
The difficulty in setting up ‘real’ partnerships lies in the complexity of the 
public monitoring of supplementary funds or personnel devoted to street policing. 
While donations to the police are acceptable, the direct payment of regular sums into 
police operational budgets by business or community stakeholders is very 
problematic, leading to a loss of independence and possible corruption of the police 
service. If mediating organisations can deal with the supplementary funds (be it 
community non-profit or business organisations), the question of monitoring the 
supplementary security personnel remains. The community initiatives seem easier to 
integrate within the local police strategies – since the private security sector has got its 
own, market-driven logic. However the formalisation of partnerships between police 
and communities have generally failed, due to their technical fragility (flexibility of 
community involvement, personalization of relationships leading to possible 
corruption and conflict, blurred boundaries between community and personal –
financial and political- interests) as well as their political difficulties (if the private 
sector can easily target the high income area, it is considered less legitimate for police 
to set up “elitist policing” thanks to the involvement of wealthy communities). 
Very aware of these complexities, the South African government is busy 
refining its monitoring of non-State security initiatives, by drafting new legislation on 
private security companies32 as well as on Community Policing Forums (the 1995 
legislation being considered to broad, having led to too big a variety of community 
security initiatives). However, the latter (in its Provincial version) seems to forbid – as 
a likely consequence of the Parkview experiment- the Community Policing Forums to 
have a close link with, or to set up and monitor any non-profit association. Initiatives 
like Atholl security project, much less genuine in terms of community involvement 
and not monitored by any public authority, are given preference and therefore are 
likely to develop, as well as communities’ collective contracts with private security 
companies – also leaving the police aside. It is as if the complexity of a formal 
agreement with the police was too dangerous, possibly associating a public authority 
with dubious (business and political) practices, which are tolerated as long as no 
                                                 
31 Shearing and Stenning 1983 ; Irish 1999. 
32 Berg 2003, Minaar 1999. 
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public authority puts its name on it: making money out of security, financing an 
“elite” police service, are accepted as long as they remain non-State initiatives, 
endorsed by non-State agents. Would it mean the abandonment of any attempt to 
monitor security networks – leaving vast areas to be policed by the private sector, 
giving up too complex partnerships with communities? 
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